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Abstract 
We examine the market reaction to events related to the standard-setting process of 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 for over 3,000 European firms that have 
adopted the IFRS. We find that the market reaction to IFRS 9 is largely affected by firm 
specific factors associated with information quality and information asymmetry. In particular, 
lower information asymmetry and higher information quality have a positive effect on 
market-adjusted returns. This is in conflict with the common view that IFRS 9 will improve 
accounting quality for those firms that need it most (namely, small firms with low liquidity 
and concentrated ownership structure). 
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1. Introduction 
 
We investigate how investors respond to the standard-setting process of new 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 - Financial Instruments - issued 
by the International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB) in 2014.  
In particular, we examine whether firm-specific factors associated with information 
quality and information asymmetry affect the market reaction to the IFRS 9 adoption 
events. This analysis is deemed necessary, because the evolving literature on capital-
market effects of IFRS indicates that firm characteristics require further investigation, 
such to better identify the drivers of the heterogeneity in the economic consequences 
(Daske et al., 2008 and 2013; Armstrong et al., 2010; Byard et al., 2011; Christensen 
et al., 2013; Joos and Leung, 2013; Dos Santos et al., 2016). Furthermore, an 
understanding of the capital-market outcomes of IFRS 9 is of interest to policy 
makers, as it helps evaluating whether the reform leads to higher financial reporting 
quality, and thus benefits international investors (IASB, 2014; European Commission, 
2015).
In this study, following Onali and Ginesti (2014), we explore the impact of the 
IFRS 9 adoption by measuring variations in the three-day market adjusted return (3-
day MAR) and by taking into account the effect on the MAR due to several economic 
factors. Unlike previous studies, we also take into account variations in the MAR that 
are due to systematic patterns in stock returns during the week (day-of-the-week 
effects), as well as Fama-French (FFF) and Carhart factors (CF). Such an approach 
allows us to considerably reduce the bias in the estimated MAR that may result from 
market-wide temporal patterns in returns or other firm-level characteristics. 
The results of our analysis reveal that the impact of the IFRS 9 adoption events 
varies across companies. Specifically, the IFRS 9 adoption events have a stronger 
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impact on firms with higher information quality and lower information asymmetry. 
Moreover, financial firms react worse than non-financial firms to IFRS 9 adoption 
events.  
We emphasize that our main contribution to the literature is twofold. First of all, by 
considering a large dataset of European listed firms, we perform a new and 
comprehensive investigation on the firm-level heterogeneities in the reaction to all 
events related to the standard-setting process of IFRS 9. Second, we provide novel 
empirical evidence of the fact that, contrary to a quite common view (see, for 
example, Armstrong et al., 2010), the IFRS adoption may not improve accounting 
quality for firms with low liquidity and high information asymmetry.  
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology and the 
data, Section 3 presents and discusses the main results obtained and Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Event dates 
We identify the IFRS 9 adoption events based on the public announcements 
provided by the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG). We use the LEXIS/NEXIS database to control for potentially confounding 
news during each event window. Such a procedure leads to a set of 22 IFRS 9 
adoption events, which are reported in Table 1.1 
A natural concern when conducting an event studies is whether the events 
considered are actually relevant to investors. To control for the relevance of the 22 
events for investors, similar to Da et al. (2011), we examine the extent to which the 
                                                          
1 For events until 31/12/2012, we maintain the same interpretation as in Onali and Ginesti (2014). 
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Google Search Volume Index (SVI) for the keyword “IFRS 9” is higher in weeks 
around these events. We run a two-sample t-test for the time period from 05/07/2009 
to 06/09/2014, and we find that in the weeks around the 22 IFRS 9 events considered 
the SVI is significantly larger (at the 1% level).  
[Insert Table 1: IFRS 9 Events]  
2.2. Methodology 
We calculate the MAR as the difference between the 3-day log stock return and the 
log return of the proxy for the market portfolio. As a proxy for the market portfolio, 
we adopt the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe (Armstrong et al., 2010). To 
examine the cross sectional determinants of MAR, we run regressions of the MAR for 
each firm i and event t on a set of firm-level covariates. In particular, to take into 
account the incremental effect of firm-specific factors, we implement several 
regression models (all the variables are described in Table 2). Specifically, we start 
from the following baseline specification focusing on factors related to information 
quality and information asymmetry: 
MARit = β1 + β2 FINANCIALit + β3 INFOQUALit + β4 FINANCIALit * INFOQUALit 
+ β5 SPREADit + β6 BIG4it + β7 INDEPit + β8 HERF + β9 CODE + εit   Eq. (1) 
The variable FINANCIAL is a dummy equal to one if the firm is in the financial 
industry and zero otherwise. Similar to Armstrong et al. (2010) and Joos and Leung, 
(2013), we consider financial firms those for which the primary two-digit SIC code is 
either 60 or 61. The variable INFOQUAL is the factor with the largest eigenvalue 
derived from Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of the variables: SIZE, 
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MARKETS, and LISTED_US. 2  For consistency with the method employed by 
Armstrong et al. (2010) and Joos and Leung (2013), we multiply factor scores by 
minus 1, so that higher values of INFOQUAL correspond to lower information 
quality. Moreover, we add an interaction between FINANCIAL and INFOQUAL, to 
estimate the incremental market reaction for those financial firms with lower quality 
information.  
We also examine the role of asymmetric information by estimating the effect of 
bid-ask spreads (SPREAD). A larger spread would be consistent with a higher degree 
of asymmetric information (Ball et al., 2012; Daske et al., 2013). In addition to this 
variable, we also include BIG_4 and INDEP. In particular, a positive coefficient on 
BIG_4 would be consistent with lower information asymmetry, because Big 4 auditor 
firms should provide better auditing reports and stronger monitoring (Joos and Leung, 
2013). A positive coefficient on INDEP would, similarly, indicate lower information 
asymmetry, because of the lack of shareholders with very large shareholdings. As 
Adams et al. (2011) explain, this variable captures the degree of independence of a 
company, and its board, from its large shareholders. The variables HERF and CODE 
are calculated based on prior studies (Ding et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010). We 
define each industry according to the primary two-digit SIC code. Following Petersen, 
(2009) and Armstrong et al. (2010), we double-cluster standard errors at both the 
country and the industry level, because of the possibility of more homogeneous 
financial reporting practices within a certain country or industry.3  
                                                          
2 This variable is borrowed from Armstrong et al. (2010), although it does not consider a fourth 
variable for the Principal Component Analysis: the accounting standard applied by the firm. We cannot 
include this variable in our setup, because all firms in our sample must apply IFRS. Consistent with 
Armstrong et al. (2010), we estimate the principal components using varimax orthogonal variation. 
3 Clustering only at the country level or only at the industry level does not substantially alter our 
results. 
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As a second specification, we include the FFC (1993), SMB and HML, and CF 
(1997), WML, to allow for the impact of size, book-to-market ratios, and momentum: 
MARit = β1 + β2 FINANCIALit + β3 INFOQUALit + β4 FINANCIALit* INFOQUALit 
+ β5 SPREADit  + β6 BIG4it + β7 INDEPit + β8 HERF + β9 CODE                         
+ β10 SMBt + β11 HMLt + β12 WMLt + εit    Eq. (2) 
To allow for day-of-the-week effects (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010), we add four 
weekday dummies to Eq. (2): 
MARit = β1 + β2 FINANCIALit + β3 INFOQUALit + β4 FINANCIALit* INFOQUALit 
+ β5 SPREADit  + β6 BIG4it + β7 INDEPit + β8 HERF + β9 CODE                          
+ β10 SMBt + β11 HMLt + β12 WMLt + Σαd Dd+ εit   Eq. (3) 
 where d = 2, 3, 4, and 5, and:  
Dd = 1  if d = 2 (Tuesday), d = 3 (Wednesday), d = 4 (Thursday), and d = 5 
(Friday).  
Dd = 0 otherwise. 
Similar to Armstrong et al. (2010), we also replace INFOQUAL by the three 
variables considered for the PCA (SIZE, LISTED_US, and MARKETS). All three 
variables are left unchanged, and therefore they are negatively correlated with 
INFOQUAL: 
MARit = β1 + β2 FINANCIALit + β3 SIZEit + β4 LISTED_USit + β5 MARKETS                  
+ β6 SPREADit + β7 BIG4it + β8 INDEPit + β9 HERF + β10 CODE                         
+ β11 SMBt + β12 HMLt + β13 WMLt + Σαd Dd+ εit   Eq. (4) 
Finally, we run Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) only for non-financial firms (Joos and Leung, 
2013), after excluding the variables FINANCIAL and FINANCIAL*INFOQUAL: 
MARit = β1 + β2 INFOQUALit + β3 SPREADit+ β4 BIG4it + β5 INDEPit + β6 HERF  
+ β7 CODE + β8 SMBt + β9 HMLt + β10 WMLt +  Σαd Dd + εit Eq. (5) 
MARit = β1 + β2 SIZEit + β3 LISTED_USit + β4 MARKETS + β5 SPREADit                         
+ β6 BIG4it + β7 INDEPit + β8 HERF + β9 CODE + β10 SMBt + β11 HMLt             
+ β12 WMLt +  Σαd Dd+ εit      Eq. (6) 
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[Insert Table 2 - Variables description] 
2.3. Data 
We merged two data sources: Amadeus (for firm-level data), and Datastream (for 
price-level data). Our sample is comprises all the listed firms in 17 European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom) that have adopted the IFRS (Chen et al., 2013).  
Specifically, on the overall we have 3.393 firms and 79.006 firm-event observations 
for the period 2009-2014.4 
3. Results 
An analysis of pairwise correlation coefficients between MAR and the explanatory 
variables (which we do not report to save space) indicates a positive effect of 
information quality and a negative effect of information asymmetry: the correlation 
coefficients for BIG_4 and INDEP are positive and significant while the coefficient 
for SPREAD is negative and significant. We also find a negative and significant 
correlation between INFOQUAL and the BIG_4, and INDEP, and a positive and 
significant correlation between INFOQUAL and SPREAD, in accordance with the 
intuition that firms with lower information quality have higher information 
asymmetry.  
                                                          
4 For certain specifications requiring a merge across different datasets, the number of observations is 
smaller. 
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The results reported in Table 3 are very robust across all specifications and suggest 
that financial firms tend to have lower MAR relative to non-financial firms. The 
coefficients on INFOQUAL are always negative and significant, suggesting that firms 
with lower pre-adoption information quality react negatively to the IFRS 9. These 
findings are confirmed by the positive coefficients on SIZE (at the 1% level) and 
MARKETS (at the 10% level). Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction term, 
namely FINANCIAL* INFOQUAL, are insignificant across all regression 
specifications. Therefore, we conclude that pre-adoption information quality does not 
have a different impact on the cross-section of MAR for financial firms relative to 
non-financial firms.  
The coefficients on BIG_4 are positive and significant, while those on SPREAD are 
negative and significant. BIG_4 is supposed to be negatively related to information 
asymmetry, while a higher SPREAD reflects a higher degree of information 
asymmetry. Therefore, our results suggest that pre-adoption information asymmetry 
has a negative effect on the price reaction to IFRS 9. The other variables controlling 
for information asymmetry are either weakly significant (INDEP) or insignificant. For 
INDEP, the coefficients are positive, which reveals that a more dispersed structure of 
the largest shareholdings increases MAR. Thus, even the results for INDEP suggest 
that a higher pre-adoption information asymmetry decreases MAR Finally, the 
inclusion of the FFF and CF and weekday dummies leaves our main results 
substantially unaltered.  
The results for Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), for which financial firms are excluded, are 
consistent with those for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). Specifically, the coefficient on 
INFOQUAL is negative and significant, the coefficients on BIG_4 are positive and 
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significant, and the coefficients on SPREAD are negative and significant. Moreover, 
the coefficient on INDEP remains positive, and it also becomes significant at the 1% 
level for Eq. (5) and at the 5% level for Eq. (6) (while being significant at the 10% 
level in Eqs (1)-(4)). Nevertheless, the coefficient on MARKETS loses significance. 
[Insert Table 3: Firm-level regressions: cross sectional determinants of MAR] 
3.1. Robustness tests 
Let us test the robustness of our results. First, we run the six regressions considered in 
Section 2 using different levels of clustering (at country level, at industry level and at 
event level). Second, we repeat the main analysis, after replacing the dependent 
variable (3-day MAR) with its values computed three days before and after the actual 
event as well as five days before and after the actual event. This type of tests is similar 
to those implemented in studies using a difference-in-differences approach such as 
Waldinger (2010). The results obtained (which we do not report to save space) are in 
line with those reported in the previous subsection, thus confirming the validity of our 
main inferences. 5 
4. Conclusions 
We have investigated the investors’ reaction to the standard-setting process of 
IFRS 9 for over 3,000 European listed firms.  
Our study offers novel and robust evidence that higher pre-adoption information 
quality and lower pre-adoption information asymmetry have a positive impact on the 
MAR. In particular, the MAR is positively related with size, a dispersed ownership 
structure, market liquidity for the firm’s stock, and having a Big 4 auditor. We also 
                                                          
5 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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provide evidence that financial firms react relatively worse than non-financial firms to 
the IFRS 9 adoption events.  
Our findings support the argument that IFRS 9 adoption may not, per se, lead to 
higher accounting quality for all firms and are starkly different from the results 
reported by Armstrong et al. (2010), who document an incrementally positive reaction 
for firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and higher pre-adoption 
information asymmetry in response to the compulsory IFRS adoption in 2005. Overall, 
our study suggests that IFRS 9 is likely to be less beneficial to financial firms, small 
firms, firms listed only on one (non-US) stock market, firms without Big 4 auditors, 
firms with a concentrated ownership structure, and firms with poor market liquidity.  
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Table 1 
IFRS events. 
N. Date Description 
Probability 
of adoption 
1 12/11/2009 IASB issues the first phase of IFRS 9. Increase 
2 16 /07/2010 EFRAG releases the comment letter on IASB ED - fair value option for financial liabilities. Increase 
3 28/10/2010 IASB issues additions to IFRS 9 for financial liability. Increase 
4 9/12/2010 IASB releases the ED on accounting for hedging activities. Increase 
5 13/01/2011 IASB and FASB publish a joint proposal on credit impairment. Increase 
6 31/01/2011 IASB and FASB publish a joint proposal on accounting for impairment of financial assets.  Increase 
7 4/03/2011 
EFRAG recommends that IASB and FASB finalize a common standard for financial 
instruments. 
Increase 
8  8/04/2011 EFRAG releases the comment letter to IASB supplementary document on impairment. Decrease 
9 4/08/2011 IASB proposes adjustments to the effective date of IFRS 9 from 1/2013 to 1/2015. Decrease 
10 16/12/2011 IASB defers the mandatory effective date from 1/2013 to 1/2015 Increase 
11 27/01/2012 
IASB and FASB inform on their common intention to reduce differences in accounting for 
financial instruments. 
Increase 
12 7/09/2012 IASB releases a draft of hedge accounting. Increase 
13 28/11/2012 IASB proposes limited changes to IFRS 9 requirements. Increase 
14 18/01/2013 EFRAG publishes its letter on IASB's Draft IFRS 9 Hedge Accounting. Increase 
15 7/03/2013 IASB revises proposal for loan-loss provisioning Increase 
16 22/03/2013 EFRAG releases the comment letter to IASB on the transition from IAS 39 to IFRS 9. Increase 
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Table 1 
IFRS events (Continued) 
N. Date Description 
Probability 
of adoption 
17 16/04/2013 EFRAG releases the comment letter to ED - Limited Amendments to IFRS 9. Decraese 
18  27/06/2013 IASB publishes amendments to IAS 39. Increase 
19 22/07/2013  EFRAG reports the Field-Test on ED Expected Credit Losses.  Increase 
20 19/11/2013  IASB finalises the chapter on general hedge accounting. Increase 
21 17/04/2014 IASB publishes DP on accounting for macro hedging.  Increase 
22 24/07/2014 IASB completes the reform. Increase 
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Table 2 
Variables description 
Variables Measurement Source 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Amadeus 
BIG4 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm was audited by the big four 
auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Amadeus 
LISTED_US 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise during the event year. 
Amadeus 
MARKETS 
Number of exchanges on which the company is listed during the 
event year. 
Amadeus 
SPREAD 
Average daily bid-ask spread calculated as: (ask–bid)/(ask+bid)/2 
using daily closing bid and ask data. 
Datastream 
INDEP 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if BvD independence indicator is A-, A, 
o A+, and 0 otherwise. For INDEP = 1, there is no shareholder with 
more than 25% direct or total ownership. 
Amadeus 
INFOQUAL 
The highest eigenvalue factor derived from principal components 
analysis of the variables: SIZE, LISTED_US, and MARKETS. 
Factor scores are multiplied by -1, so that a higher value for 
INFOQUAL corresponds to lower information quality (Armstrong et 
al., 2010). 
Authors’ calculations 
FINANCIAL 
Indicator variables equal to 1 if the firm’s two-digit SIC industry 
code is 60 or 61, and 0 otherwise. 
Amadeus 
HERF 
Sum of squared market shares (percentage of sales over total sales in 
the industry as defined by the two-digit SIC industry code) for all 
firms in that industry. 
Authors’ calculations 
CODE 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country of origin of the firm is a 
code-law country.  
La Porta et al. (1998)  
SMB Fama-French Small-Minus-Big factor. 
Kenneth French’s 
website 
HML Fama-French High-Minus-Low factor. 
Kenneth French’s 
website 
WML Carhart Winners-Minus-Losers factor. 
Kenneth French’s 
website 
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Table 3 
 Firm-level regressions: Cross-sectional determinants of 3-day MAR 
 Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) 
       
FINANCIAL -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***   
 (-3.247) (-3.028) (-3.239) (-3.556)   
INFOQUAL -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001***  
 (-2.856) (-2.852) (-2.863)  (-2.792)  
FIN.* INFOQU. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
 (-0.884) (-0.894) (-0.915)    
SIZE    0.000***  0.000** 
    (3.008)  (2.511) 
LISTED_US    -0.000  -0.000 
    (-0.225)  (-0.408) 
MARKETS    0.000*  0.000 
    (1.673)  (1.589) 
BIG4 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (3.934) (4.062) (3.893) (3.150) (3.322) (2.495) 
INDEP 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (1.876) (1.848) (1.852) (1.673) (2.583) (2.281) 
SPREAD -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.010** 
 (-3.341) (-3.289) (-3.212) (-2.986) (-2.578) (-2.225) 
HERF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.986) (-1.343) (-1.011) (-0.869) (-1.406) (-1.373) 
CODE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.253) (-0.340) (-0.252) (-0.819) (-0.299) (-0.962) 
HML  0.236*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 
  (12.996) (10.125) (10.171) (9.417) (9.467) 
SMB  -0.117*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.222*** -0.221*** 
  (-7.962) (-12.096) (-12.195) (-11.814) (-11.924) 
WML  -0.105*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.154*** -0.153*** 
  (-7.973) (-12.923) (-12.941) (-13.199) (-13.183) 
       
Weekday 
dummies 
NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.012*** 
 (10.706) (9.870) (-5.108) (-6.223) (-4.694) (-5.243) 
Sectors 76 76 76 76 74 74 
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Firms  3933 3933 3933 3933 3576 3576 
Observations 79,006 79,006 79,006 79,006 71,934 71,934 
R-squared 0.002 0.025 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 
Notes. Table 3 reports the results for the cross-sectional determinants of the 3-day MAR. Standard errors are clustered at both the 
industry and country level for Eq. (3) and Eq. (6). *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** Denotes significance at the 5% level.  
* Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
